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COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM POST-SCHAFFER: THE
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PREEMPTION IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION
Lara Gelbwasser Freed*
Cooperative Federalism has been, to date, a short expression
for a constantly increasing concentration of power at
Washington in the instigation and supervision of local
policies. . . . [T]oday[,] the question faces us whether the
constituent States of the [Federal} System can be ... saved as
the vital cells that they have been heretofore of democratic
sentiment, impulse, and action. 1

I. INTRODUCTION

Faced with federal statutory silence as to who bears the
burden of proof in a special education due process hearing, the
Supreme Court in Schaffer v. Weast followed the ordinary
"default rule" that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove
their claims. 2 The Court allocated the burden of proof3 to the
* Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.S., Cornell University, School ofindustrial
and Labor Relations; J.D., Harvard Law School. The author would like to acknowledge
the support of the Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Stipend Program. The
author would also like to thank Dana Brakman-Reiser for her thoughtful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article. Finally, the author would like to thank her fam ily for their
love and support.
1. EdwardS. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 21, 23
(1950).
2. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56-57 (2005); see KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL.,
McCORMI CK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (5th ed. 1999) ("The burdens of pleading and proof
with regard to most facts have been and should be assigned to the plaintiff who
genera lly seeks to change the present state of affairs a nd who th erefore naturally
should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.") . But see S chaffer,
546 U. S. at 62 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("It is common ground that no 8ingle principle
or rule solves all cases by setting forth a general test for ascertaining the incidence of
proof burdens when both a statute and its legislative history are silent on the
question.").
3. While the term "burden of proof' historically encompassed both the "burden of
persuasion" (which party loses if the evidence is closely balanced) and the "burden of
production" (which party bears the obligation to come forw ard with the evidence), only
the burden of persuasion was at issue in S chaffer. 546 U.S. at 55-56. Accordingly, this
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party seeking relief-typically, parents challenging a student's
individualized education program (IEP) under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 4 The Court limited its
holding, however, to the "case at hand," where parents of a
middle school student with learning disabilities and speechlanguage impairments challenged an IEP offered by a school
district in Maryland. 5 In doing so, the Court left open a
question of widespread reach: that is, whether states may
override the default rule and always place the burden of proof
on the school district at an administrative hearing challenging
a student's IEP. 6
This article posits that state-led legislation expressly
indicating who has the burden of proof is the correct result,
consistent with the IDEA's statutory text, purpose, and history,
and the Supreme Court's holding in Schaffer. Thus, while much
of the scholarship surrounding Schaffer focuses on the proper
allocation of the burden of proof as between parents and the
school district, this article shifts the focus back to the proper
entity to determine that allocation as between states and the
federal government. Clarifying states' right to determine the
burden of proof in special education due process hearings is
critical to preserving the integrity of states' decision-making as
state legislation takes shape.
For many states, Schaffer went against a long-standing
practice of assigning the burden of proof to the school district,
which was believed to be in a better position to defend the
appropriateness of an IEP.7 At the time of Schaffer, seven
states 8 had statutes or regulations expressly assigning the
Article refers to the burden of persuasion when using the term "burden of proof."
4. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61. The IDEA is the primary federal law governing
special education services for children with disabilities. S ee 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-141 5.
For consistency, this Article r efers to both the current federal law and its predecessors
as "the IDEA," unless otherwise specified.
5. Schaffer, 546 U.S . a t 61.
6. Id.
7. Among the federal appellate courts that considered the burden of proof
question before Schaffer, t he First, Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth , a nd District
of Columbia Circuits had held that school hoards bore the bu rden of proof. States under
the jurisdiction of these circuits that did not have state statute s or regulations
expressly assigning the burden of proof included Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevad a , New H ampshire, New J ersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin.
8. Those states were Alaska, Con necticut, Washington D.C . (included as a
"state" here for ease of refere nce), Delaware, Georgia, Minneso ta , and West Virginia.

1]

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

105

burden of proof to the school district in an IDEA due process
hearing. 9 However, because Maryland had no such statute or
regulation, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to address
whether its allocation of the burden of proof under the IDEA
preempted contrary state legislation. 10 To date, Congress has
maintained legislative silence on this question. Indeed, the
final implementing regulations for the IDEA's most recent
amendments simply defer to the Supreme Court's decision in
Schaffer on the burden of proof allocation and note that
"further regulation in this area is unnecessary." 11
Justice Breyer, dissenting in Schaffer, would have left the
allocation decision entirely to the states, such that an
administrative law judge (ALJ) or hearing officer would
determine how general state administrative procedures apply
in the absence of IDEA-specific burden of proof legislation. 12
Neither party raised this argument in Schaffer.
In the wake of Schaffer, however, a variant of Justice
Breyer's dissentrespecting states' right to determine the burden of proof as
a matter of "cooperative federalism"-has actually begun to
S ee ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550(e)(9) (2003); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h14 (2005); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5, § 3030.3 (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3140
(1999); GA. COMP. R. & REGS.l60-4-7. 18(1)(g)(8) (2002); MINN. STAT.§ 125A.091, subd.
16 (2004); and W. VA. CODER. § 126-16-S.l.ll(c) (2005). While Alabama's previous
administrative code rules, cited in Schaffer, provided th at the school district assume
the burden of proof r egarding the appropriateness of services proposed or provided in
impartial due process hearings, Alabam a's new rules , effective as regular rules on
Sept e mber 15, 2005, shifted that burden. See ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-8-9.08(8)(c)
(2005) (providin g that the party filing the hearing r equest ha s the burden to prove
hi s/her allegations to be fact). Illinois' statutes-both at the time of Schaffer and
currently-refer only to the school district's duty to present evidence in impartial due
process h earings , with no express assignment of the burden of persuasion. See 105 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/14-8.02a(g-55) (2007).
9. The IDEA provides parents and school districts with the opportunity for an
impartial due process hearing whenever they are involved in a complaint regarding a
public school's identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child, or the
provision of a fre e appropriate public education to such child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(!) and
§1415(b)(6)(A). Section 1415(!) requires that a State or local education agency conduct
the hearing, as determined by State law or by the State educational agency. The party
r equesting the hearing must confine the subject matter of the hearing to issues raised
in the du e process complaint notice, unless the other party agrees otherwise. 20 U.S. C.
§ 1415(4)(3)(B). Th e amount of the hearing officer's discre tion to find statutory
violations depends upon whether the alleged violations are substantive or procedural.
See infra note 52.
10. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61-62.
11. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46540, 46706 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt.
300 & 301). The final implementing regulations took effect on October 13, 2006.
12. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 68--69 (Breyer, J. , di ssenting).
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emerge. Lower federal courts have upheld the validity of state
statutes and regulations expressly placing the burden of proof
on the school district in impartial due process hearings under
the IDEA. 13 Meanwhile, states with and without statutory or
regulatory IDEA-specific burden-of-proof schemes at the time
of Schaffer have moved to legislate the burden of proof to either
undo or redo the status quo pre-Schaffer.
The model of cooperative federalism emerging postSchaffer, however, is only robust to the extent that federal
courts uniformly respect states' authority to statutorily assign
the burden of proof, while states legislate the burden of proof in
response to state and local needs and policy priorities.
Departing from this model, the Eighth Circuit recently held it
was a "fundamental error" for the ALJ and District Court to
assign the burden of persuasion to a Minnesota school district
in a special education due process hearing, despite the fact that
Minnesota has a statute specifically allocating the burden of
proof to the school district at such a hearing. 14 Moreover, some
recent state activity regarding the IDEA burden of proof
reflects efforts to amend existing legislation or stall proposed
legislation based, in part, on compliance with federal law. 15
These efforts are misplaced and counter-productive. The
discourse should not be about reconciling "inconsistent" legal
principles or "circumventing" the Supreme Court's decision in
Schaffer, but about holding state legislatures and officials
accountable for what remains their decision.
To begin, Part II of this article addresses what is at stake
with the placement of the burden of proof in impartial due
process hearings, and why it matters who gets to decide. Next,
Part III traces the IDEA's statutory design as a model of
cooperative federalism and, in keeping with this design,
questions the propriety of a national, uniform burden-of-proof
rule.
The article then turns to the post-Schaffer legal landscape
in Parts IV and V. Part IV explores the rationale of federal
court decisions that have addressed the preemption question
left unsettled by the Supreme Court and Congress. Part V
examines the IDEA-specific burden of proof legislation

13. S ee infra Part IV.
14. M.M. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 F.3d 455, 458-59 (8th Cir. 2008).
15. See infra Part V.

1]

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

107

developing across the states in their efforts to respond to
Schaffer's change in federal law, and analyzes state policy
"choices" as they appear motivated by or hidden behind the
need to align state procedure with federal law. Finally, Part VI
provides a brief conclusion.

II.

WHAT IS AT STAKE

The burden of proof was outcome-determinative in Schaffer.
Brian Schaffer's parents believed that Brian needed smaller
classes and more intensive services, so they initiated a due
process hearing to challenge the initial IEP proposed by the
Montgomery County Public Schools System (MCPS). 16 After a
three-day hearing, "the ALJ deemed the evidence close, held
that the parents bore the burden of persuasion, and ruled in
favor of the school district." 17 On reconsideration of the case,
following the district court's conclusion that the burden
properly belonged on the school district, the ALJ deemed the
evidence "truly in 'equipoise"' and ruled in favor of the
parents. 18 On appeal, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit
reversed, finding no persuasive reason to depart from the
normal rule allocating the burden to the party seeking relief. 19
The Supreme Court affirmed. 20
Cases likes Schaffer, where the evidence is in "precise
equipoise," should be rare. 21 Indeed, one week after the
Supreme Court decided Schaffer, a special education lawyer
opined that "only a foolhardy parents' lawyer would ever
approach a case and factor in [the] burden of proof in strategic
decision- making." 22
16. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 54-55.
17. Id.
18. Id. Around the time of the District Court's decision, MCPS offered Brian a
placement in a high school with a special learning center. Brian's parents accepted and
Brian was educated in that program until he graduated from high school. The suit
remained alive, however, because Brian's parents sought compensation for his private
school tuition and related expenses.
19. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2004) .
20. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 49.
21. Id. at 68 (Breyer, J., dissenting) .
22. Posting of Charles P. Fox to Special Education Law Blog, "Schaffer v. Weast:
The
Sky
is
Not
Falling"
(Nov.
21,
2005),
http://specialedlaw.blogs.com/home/2005/11/shaffer_v_weast.html (Nov. 21, 2005, 19:30
CST); see also Arkansas Governor's DD Center. Supreme Court Ruling's Impact, A
White Paper, http://www.ddcouncil.org/pdfs/whitepaper.pdf (concluding that placing
the burden of persuasion on parents challenging an IEP "should not be a disadvantage
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The significance of the burden of proof, however, extends
beyond its outcome- determinative nature. Placement of the
burden of proof, with its attendant considerations of "policy ...
convenience ... [and] fairness," 23 raises the question of how
best to balance costs, resources, access to information, and
expertise, in the context of ensuring a "free appropriate public
education"24 for all children with disabilities. Answers to this
question are, not surprisingly, highly politicized. More than
twenty disability organizations and twelve states filed amicus
briefs with the Supreme Court in Schaffer. The United States
itself switched sides by the time the case reached the Supreme
Court. This flip-flop offers a neat glimpse into the competing
policy arguments surrounding the burden-of-proof allocation.
In 2000, the United States filed an amicus brief before the
Fourth Circuit, arguing that the District Court correctly placed
the burden of proof on the school district to show the adequacy
of its proposed IEP at the due process administrative hearing. 25
The United States warned that holding otherwise would
"unhinge" the IDEA's statutory framework; that is, a school
would be allowed to propose an IEP, and then abstain from the
school's statutory obligation to provide a free appropriate
public education, by forcing parents who disagree with the IEP
to prove that it is inadequate. 26
[for parents] compa r ed to present (good) practi ce"). But see Gaglia rdo v. Arlington Ce nt.
Sch. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 2d 559, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) , rev'd on other wounds. 2007 WL
1545988 (2007) (recognizing that "[w)hen one does not have th e burde n of proof [in an
IDEA due process hearing] , sound litigation strategy might well dict a te tha t ce rtain
questions not be asked, that r ecord ma tters left open by an opponent not be cla rified ,
that witnesses whose testimony would otherwise be necessary not be called, a nd that
exhibits tha t could have been relied on not be int roduced"); Antoin e M. v. Chester
Upla nd Sch. Dist., 420 F. Supp . 2d 396, 404- 05 (E.D. Pa . 2006) (recognizing that
parents' decision to present new expert testimony a t the district court level may be
rela ted to S chaffer's s hift in the burde n of proof at the administra tive hearing).
23. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at § 337.
24. A "free appropriate public education" refers to "special educa tion and related
services that-A) h ave been provided at public expe nse, unde r public s upervision and
direction, without cha rge; (B) meet the st andards of t he State educa tional a gency; (C)
include an a ppropriate preschool, ele mentary school, or secondary school educa tion in
the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized
educa tion program r equired under section 1414(d) of thi s ti tle" 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)
(2005).
25. Brief for the United States a s Amicus Curiae Supporting Appell ees Urging
Affirmance at *5, Schaffer v. Vance, 2 F. App'x 232 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-147 1), 2000
WL 3399181 8.
26. ld.; see also N. J. DEP'T OF THE P UI3. ADVOCATE, D IY. Of DEY. DISABILITY
ADVOCACY, ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROO F IN SP EC IAL EOU CATION DU E
PROCESS HEARINGS 12 (2007) [hereinafter SPECIAL ED UCATIO N Dm: Pl(()CESSl.
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In rebutting school board association arguments that the
IDEA already provides sufficient procedural safeguards for
parents, the United States recognized the disconnect between
the procedural right to be involved and actual involvement or
meaningful inputY Unlike school districts which retain
taxpayer-financed lawyers and rely on the school's own
employees to testify in due process hearings, parents of
children with disabilities are often unable to afford legal
counsel and expert witnesses. 28 Studies have revealed that
most parents describe themselves as "terrified and
inarticulate" in IEP meetings, and that professionals
acknowledge their use of knowledge and language that parents
do not understand. 29 Moreover, while the IDEA provides that
parents have access to their child's records and evaluations or
recommendations that the school intends to use at a due
process hearing, 30 schools are not required to produce evidence
of how other similarly situated children have fared in proposed
programs or placements. As explained by New Jersey's Public
Advocate, for example, a school district would be unlikely to
introduce evidence showing that a particular autism program
had a history of failures-information that parents may have

27. ld. at *15--16; see also MAHK KELMAN & GiLLIAN LESTER, J UMPI NG THE
QUEUE: AN lN<~UIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING
DI SABII.ITH:S 87 (1997) (s tudying the IDEA's implementation in local pra ctice).
28. See Sta tement of the Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA)
Amicus Committee (Jan. 2006) , http://www.copaa.net/news/schaffer.html. See generally
M. WAGNE I{, C. MARDER, J. BLACKORBY, & D. CARDOSO, THE CHILDREN WE SEINE: THE
DEMOGRAPHIC CHAHACTEHISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES
AND
THEIH
HOUSEHOLDS
23-24,
28-29
(2002) ,
http://www .seels.net/designdocs/SEELS_Children_ We_Serve_Report.pdf. While parents
now have the right to challen ge a school district's IEP in court without legal counsel,
Wink elm a n v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007), that right does not
alleviate parents' in a bility to na vi gate the IDEA "maze" themselves , from identifica tion
and evaluation through hearings and court actions. The Supreme Court's ruling in
Arlington u. Murphy added to the expense of exercising due process hea ring rights , as
the Court h eld prevailing parents cannot recover non-attorney expert fe es under the
IDEA's fee-shifting provision. 548 U.S. 291 , 299-300 (2006).
29. David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational
Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 188-89 (1991); see also
NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, lMPHOVING THE IMPLEMENTATION Of' THE INDIVIDUALS
WITH DlSABILlTIES EDUCATION ACT: MAKING S CHOOLS WOHK FOR ALL OF AMERICA'S
CHILDREN
(1995) ,
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/ 1995/95school.htm
(reporting pa rents' testimony that the IEP process is "extremely frustrating, often
intimidating, and h ardly ever conducive to making the m feel tha t they were equal
partners with professionals").
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1) and§ 1415(f)(2)(A) (2005).
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no other way of accessing. 31 However, if the school district bore
the burden of proof to establish the adequacy of an IEP, the
district would have to present proof that the program in
question works. 32
In its brief before the Fourth Circuit, the United States
conceded that having schools carry the burden of proof
regarding the adequacy of a proposed IEP "should not
substantially increase the workload for the school." 33 The
United States also rejected the school's argument that
deference to state and local authorities' expertise creates a
presumption in favor of the IEP placement proposed by school
districts. According to the United States, applying a
presumption of correctness to a draft IEP rejected by parents
would "unjustifiably reduce" the IDEA's goal of making parents
meaningful participants in the IEP process. 34
Nonetheless, in June 2005, after a change in
administration, the United States changed positions and filed
an amicus brief supporting Respondents (the MCPS
Superintendent and the Board of Education) before the
Supreme Court in Schaffer. By way of a footnote in its brief,
31. See SPECIAL EDUCATION DUE PROCESS, supra note 26, at 12.
32. ld.
33. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees Urging
Affirmance at *12, Schaffer, 2 F. App'x. 232 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-1 471), 2000 WL
33991818. The school is already required to evaluate (and reevaluate, if necessary) a
child's educational needs by cons ulting with various school officials and other
individuals who have knowledge or special expertise regarding the child. 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1414(a), 1414(d)(B) (2005). After a school conducts an evalu ation of a child, the
school must provide the parents of that child with prior written notice that describes
the action proposed or refu sed, the tests and procedures used as a basis for
determining that particular course of action, why the school proposed or refused to take
the action, and why other options were rejected. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(1) (2005). If the
sch ool has not sent a prior written notice regarding the subject matter of a parent's due
process complaint, the school must answer such a complaint, in writing, with the same
information. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(B)(i)(l) (2005). Moreover, in drafting an IEP, the
school must describe, inter alia, t he child's disability, how the disability affects the
child's involvement and progress in the general education curriculum, the special
education and related services to be provided, expectations for the child's progress
under the IEP, and how that progress will be measured. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)
(2005).
34. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees Urging
Affirmance at *11, Schaffer, 2 F. App 'x 232 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-1471), 2000 WL
33991818; see also Reply Brief of Petitioners at *6, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (No. 04-698),
2005 WL 1812490 (reasoning that when there is only a proposed IEP, with no
agr eement reached between parents and the school district, there is no official action to
which a "presumption of regularity" can attach). Similarly, when there is no previously
established IEP, neither side can claim that its proposal represents the status quo. Id.
at *4 .
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the United States explained that:
[a]fter careful review of its administrative practice, the
relevant case law, and the text, structure and history of the
IDEA, including the 2004 Amendments to the Act, the
government is now of the view that, where as here, a State
has not placed the burden of proof on school districts as a
matter of state law, the traditional rule that the burden of
proof falls on the party seeking relief applies to IDEA due
process hearings. 35

The United States now agreed with the school board's
argument that the IDEA's procedural safeguards were
sufficient to address any policy concerns r egarding schools'
unfair advantage over parents. 36 According to the United
States' new position, Congress' aim to restore trust and reduce
litigation with the 2004 IDEA amendments would be
undermined by imposing a "non-textual" burden of proof on
schools that amounts to a "presumption of invalidity" for
actions by public officials and is "foreign· to analogous civil and
administrative proceedings.'>)?
The 2004 IDEA amendments added informal resolution
opportunities for parents and schools. Voluntary mediation
must now be available, even for matters arising before the
filing of a due process hearing request. 38 Due process disputes
that are not mediated are subject to a new, mandatory
"resolution session" attended by parents, school officials, and
35. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *6
n.2 , Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698) , 2005 WL 1527082.
36. ld. at *26-27. Prior to the 2004 amendments, however, the IDEA already
required that parents be informed about and consent to evaluations of their child. 20
U.S.C . § 1414(c)(3) (2005). Parents were already included as members of "IEP Teams."
20 U.S .C. § 1415(b)(l) (2005). Parents had the right to examine all records relating to
their child, and to obtain an "independent educational evaluation" of their child. 20
U.S. C. § 1415(b)(l) (2005). Parents had to be given written prior notice of any changes
in an IEP, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2005), and be notified in writing of the procedural
safeguards available to them under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(l)(A) (2005). If
parents believed an IEP was inappropriate, they had the right to seek an
administrative "impartial due process hearing," where they could present evidence and
cross-examine relevant witnesses with the assistance of legal counsel. 20 U.S.C. §§
1415(£) and 1415(h)(1)-(2) (2005). Parents could also appeal an a dverse hearing decision
to a state review officer, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2005), where applicable, before
challenging an administrative decision in state or federal court, 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(A) (2005). Prevailing parents could recover attorneys' fees. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2005).
37. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *2425, Schaffer, 546 U.S . 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 WL 1527082.
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)( l) (2005).
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relevant IEP team members, with the possibility of a binding
settlement if the parties reach an agreement. 39
Drawing on Congress' intent to reduce the IDEA's
administrative and litigation-related costs with the 2004
amendments, respondents in Schaffer argued that placing the
burden on schools would encourage litigious parents to "snub
the intended IEP process, or turn it into a dry run or fishing
expedition for adjudication." 40 The 2004 amendments, however,
provide a built-in disincentive against "fishing expeditions" by
allowing prevailing schools to recover attorneys' fees if parents
are found to have filed a frivolous or improper complaint. 41
Moreover, as warned by those opposing the default rule,
assigning the burden to parents could actually increase due
process complaints by decreasing schools' accountability-or,
alternatively, create a chilling effect on parents' meritorious,
due process complaints.42
The policy tensions and uncertainty surrounding the
burden-allocation question underscore the importance of states'
right to decide. The answer need not be the same for all states
and all purposes. States may opt for different burden-of-proof
allocations in IDEA due process hearings based on states'
particular policy priorities and special education needs, shaped
by differences in, inter alia, states' incomes, population
compositions, parent and teacher training opportunities, indistrict placement options, intervention and referral services,
and instructional and support services. In their role as
"laboratories of experimentation,"43 states can draft provisions
to account for and potentially vary the burden of persuasion,
the burden of production, the burden of proof for appeals, the
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(l)(B)(i)-(iii) (2005). The resolution session provides for a
mandatory thirty-day cooling off period prior to the initiation of a due process hearing.
!d. § 1415(f)(l)(B)(ii) (2005).
40. Brief for Res pondent s at *36, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005), (No. 04-698), 2005
WL 1505062.
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)-(III).
42. Oral Argument at *58, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (No. 04-698), 2005 WL 265139 1;
see also Reply Brief of Petitioner s at *1 3, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 4H (No. 04-698), 2005 WL
1812490; Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Weas t, 377 F. 3d at
459 (Luttig, J., dissenting) ("Saddled with a proof burden in administrative 'due
process' hearings, parents are likely to find a district-proposed IEP 'resistant to
challenge"')).
43. See New State l ee Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, :311 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility ... It is one of th e h a ppy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may , if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory").
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burden of proof at different stages of the IEP process, the
burden of proof for discipline matters, and/or the burden of
proof for unilateral private placement tuition reimbursement
requests. States can also accord the ALJ or hearing officer
discretion to modify the general burden-of-proof rules in
individual cases.
Further, states can gather and analyze data and interview
local constituents to assess the educational, social, and
economic outcomes of potential burden-allocation schemes, or
to study the impact of an allocation scheme already in place.
Indeed, disability advocates have proposed statewide surveys
to obtain information regarding: (i) whether there has been any
appreciable change in the number of due process hearings in
states where the burden has been shifted from the school
district to the moving party; (ii) the results of special education
cases following a change in state burden-of-proof regulations;
(iii) the number of parent and teacher IDEA training
opportunities and attendees; and (iv) the actual ability or
inability of parents to obtain records from their school districts
about their own child and to access evaluations by individuals
with expertise in their child's disability. 44 New Jersey's
Department of the Public Advocate solicited widespread input
from government offices, professional associations, school
administrators, education professionals, special education
attorneys, advocates, service providers, and families to
research Schaffer's impact in reversing New Jersey's longstanding practice of assigning the burden of proof to the school
district .45 The D.C. Appleseed Center and DLA Piper Rudnick

44. See, e.g, Letter from Sonja D. Kerr, Supervising Attorney, Disability Law Ctr.
of Ala ., to Comm 'r Roger Sampson, Dep't of Educ. & Early Dev. 5 (Feb. 8, 2006).
45. See SPECIAL EDUCATION DUE PROCESS, supra note 26, at 2 (Jan. 2007)
(concluding that the burden of proof should be reallocated to school districts in New
,Jersey for the following reasons: "(i) [s]chool districts are in a far better position to bear
the burden of proof than families; (ii) [a]llowing the burden of proof to remain on
parents, who are already disadvantaged in this process. will significantly impede their
ab ility to enforce their child's educational rights under the ID EA, (iii) [t]he limited
discovery procedu re s in due process hearings in New J ersey make it difficult for
parents to uncover and obtain evidence needed to satisfy the burden of proof .. . ; [and]
(iv) [a) llocating t he burden of proof to school districts will not place an undue burden on
school districts or taxpayers, and will not result in an increase in the number of due
process proceedings initiated by parents ... "). Interestingly, a September 2007 study on
specia l education fin a ncing and delivery commissioned by the New Jersey School
Boards Association reached the opposite conclusion regarding the appropriate
a ssign ment of the burden of proof in a due process hearing challenging a student's IEP.
See MARl MOLENAAR & MICHAEL LUCIANO, FI NANCING SPECIAL EDUCATION IN NEW

114

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2009

LLP are currently performing an outside assessment of the
effectiveness of D.C.'s regulatory shift in the burden of proof to
the moving party. 46
Thus, respecting states' right to determine the burden of
proof as a matter of "cooperative federalism" is about more
than simply reserving education to the states under the Tenth
Amendment; it is about leaving room for states to develop best
practices for special education by tailoring IDEA substantive
and procedural standards to states' policy priorities and needs
in a manner that equals or exceeds the federal floor.

III. THE IDEA: A "COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM" PARADIGM
"Cooperative federalism," in theory, is "a system in
which ... divided authority is brought together again" in a way
that "enables the cooperating governments to benefit from one
another's special capacities while still preserving the value of
political pluralism." 47 A scholar in the field of environmental
policy recently described the "operative" principle of
cooperative federalism as follows: "the federal government
establishes a policy ... and then enlists the aid of the states,
through a combination of carrots, such as financial aid, and
sticks, such as the imposition of constraints ... through federal
regulation, in pursuing that policy."48 The IDEA, enacted
pursuant to the Spending Clause, 49 fits squarely within this
J ERSEY, Executive Summary, Sept. 2007. The study recommended, inter alia, that
state special education regulations reflect the Schaffer decision a nd allocate the burden
of proof to the plaintiff (usually the parent) because directors of special education
services believe that this allocation will help facilitate early dispute resolution while
reducing costs to both parents and school districts. I d.
46. DLA Piper LLP Pro Bono, Signature Projects, Special Education,
http://www.dlapiperprobono.com/impact/signatureprojects/casedetail.aspx?case=87.
According to the resolution adopted by the D.C. Board of Education on March 13, 2006,
a n evaluation of D.C.'s shift in the burden of proof would incorporate the following
data: "the number of due process hearings, mediation, success rate of parties seeking
re lief, the timeliness of responses to parental requests for services, services to st udents,
economic savings, and parental satisfaction." D.C. Bd. of Educ. Res. SR06-20 at 2 (D.C.
2006).
47. MARTHA DERTHICK, TH E INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
IN MASSACHUSETTS 220 (1970) (analyzing cooperative federalism in t he
implementation of the Social Security Act).
48. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperati ve to Inoperative Federalism : The
Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 754
(2006).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has acknowledged th at the
IDEA is, in fact , more than a "simple funding statute," as it co nfers upon disabled
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model by leaving to the states the "primary responsibility for
developing and executing educational programs for
handicapped
children,"
while
imposing
"significant
requirements to be followed m the discharge of that
responsibility" as a pre-requisite for federal financial
assistance .50
Political accountability, however, is uniquely murky when
it comes to deciding the burden of proof allocation in IDEA due
process hearings. The cloudiness stems from more than just
Congress' conditional grant of funding to the states under the
IDEA's Spending Clause structure. The evasion of political
accountability in the Spending Clause context has been
described before: federal legislators can point to states'
voluntary decision to accept federal funds, while states may
claim they could not, in practical terms, decline the funds. 51
Neither the IDEA nor its legislative history, however, specifies
the burden of proof procedure states must follow in
administrative hearings once states have consented to federal
regulation. 52 Congress left the IDEA burden-of-proof issue to
the judiciary to decide, and the Supreme Court remained silent
on whether states have the right to override the Court's own
default rule.
In setting the boundaries of its default rule in Schaffer,
though, the Supreme Court did indicate which arm of the state
students an enforceable substantive right to public education in participating states.
See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310 (1988); see also Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 64 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) ("The IDEA ... casts an affirmative, be neficiary-specific obligation on
providers of public education").
50. S chaffer, 546 U.S. at 52 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch.
Dist ., Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982)).
51. S ee Note, Federalism, Political Accountability, and the Spending Clause, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1420, 1436 (1994) (analyzing the Supreme Court's differing levels
of deference to congressional authority in the Commerce Clause a nd Spending Clause
contexts, and calling for a "heightened sensitivity to t he ways in which conditional
grants create impediment s to political accountability); see also Ann Althouse,
Variations on a Theory of Normativ e Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE
L.J. 979, 1018 (1993) (noting that "[c]ooperative federalism can become a temptmg
device for insula ting officeholders at both th e state a nd federal levels").
52. IDEA 2004 provides only that a hearing officer's decision "shall be made on
substantive grounds based on a determination of wh eth er the child received a free
appropriate public educa tion." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i) (2005): With .r espect to
matters all eging procedural violations, the Act allows a hean ng off1 cer to fmd that.. a
free appropriate public education wa s denied where the procedural 1~adequac1es: 1)
impeded the child's r ight to a free appropriate public educatJOn, n) s1gmficantly
impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decJ swn- makmg process
rega rding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the pare ~ts' ch1ld, or
iii) cau sed a deprivation of educational benefits." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(u) (2005).
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should decide the IDEA burden of proof allocation if left up to
the states. The Court referred to the "laws or regulations" of
several states that had placed the burden of proof on school
districts by citing to statutes and regulations-not court
decisions-from those states. 53 Indeed, the Supreme Court's
Schaffer decision made no mention of any state supreme court
that had placed the burden of proof on the school district in a
due process hearing challenging a student's IEP.54 During oral
argument in Schaffer, Justice Scalia remarked that he was
"loath to think that just because a State supreme court says
that every school district in the State has to bear the burden of
proof, that Congress intended that to be the case." 55
The Supreme Court has, in the past, cautioned federal
courts against imposing their views concerning education on
the states, explaining that courts lack the "specialized
knowledge and experience" necessary to resolve difficult
questions of educational policy. 56 At the same time, federal
courts have recognized that reducing all state standards to a
federal mm1mum would conflict with the cooperative
federalism that is the "structural principle undergirding the
[IDEA] ." 57 Calling on judicial respect for federalist principles,
Justice Breyer's dissent in Schaffer acknowledged the Supreme
Court's usual practice of leaving a "range of permissible choices
to the States" when interpreting statutes designed to advance
cooperative federalism. 58 Thus, interpreting the Supreme
Court's Schaffer decision to support a preemptive, uniform

53. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 6 1.
54. Prior to Schaffer, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had placed the burden of
proof on t he school district, regardless of which party sought relief. See Lascari v. Bel. of
Educ. of Ra mapo Indian Hills Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 560 A.2d 1180, 1187-89 (1989),
abrogated by L.E. v. Ram sey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 391 (3d Cir. 2006), discussed
infra. a t note 81.
55. Transcript of Oral Argument, at *49- 50, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04698), 2005 WL 2651391.
5(i. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207- 08. (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973).
57. David D. v. Dartmouth Sch . Comm., 775 F.2d 411 , 419 (1st Cir. 1985). Other
circuit courts later followed suit in r eaffirming states' au thority to exceed the federal
floor under the ID EA, and enforcing more stringe nt state standards through the IDEA.
See e.g , Johnson v. lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1029- 30 (lOth Cir. 1990) ;
Burke County Bd . of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 982- 83 (4th Cir. 1990); Ed. of
Educ. of East Windsor Reg'! Sch. Dist. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 992 (3d Cir. 1986);
Blackm on v. Springfield R-XII Sch. Dist., 198 F.:3d 648, 658-59 (8th Cir. 2000).
58. S chaffer, 546 U.S. at 71 (Breyer, J ., dissenting) (quoting Wi sconsin Dep't of
Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 4 73, 495 (2002)).
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burden-of-proof rule under the IDEA would mean federal
interference with states on one level, and judicial interference
with legislatures or administrative agencies on another.
While silent on the burden-of-proof allocation, IDEA
legislative history makes clear that Congress did not intend to
wholly preempt the primacy of states in the field of special
education. In explaining the Conference Committee Bill for the
IDEA's predecessor in 1975, Senator Stafford remarked: "Make
no mis take, educating our children is still very much a State
responsibility, and this bill does not change that ... 59 By its
very terms, the IDEA's purpose is to "assist" states in the
provision of education for all children with disabilities. 60 The
IDEA's provisions reinforce states' traditional authority: each
state seeking federal assistance must develop a plan which
details the policies and procedures that ensure provision of a
free appropriate public education in the least restrictive
environment for all children with disabilities; 61 a free
appropriate public education, in turn, must "meet the
standards of the state educational agency;" 62 each state must
also establish the requisite procedural safeguards, including
impartial due process hearings where aggrieved parents may
present a complaint related to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of their child, or the provision of a free
appropriate public education to their child; 63 each state must
further ensure that local educational agencies in the state will
establish the individualized education programs required by
the Act. 64
To the extent, then, that the majority in Schaffer
determined that convenience and fairness considerations do not
necessitate a departure from the ordinary default rule for
assigning the burden of proof in special education due process
hearings, that determination does not and should not bind
states. Respondents in Schaffer, along with the United States,
individual states, and school board associations filing as amici
curiae in support of Respondents, agreed that "nothing in the

59. Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. for Mass., 736 F.2d 773, 785 n.ll (1st
Cir. 1984) citing 121 Cong. Rec. 37411 (Nov. 19, 1975).
60. 20 U.S.C. ~ 1400(d) .
Gl. 20 U.S. C. § 141 2(a)(l).
G2. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(B).
G:l. 20 U S.C. §§ 1412(a)(6)- 141 5(f).
G4. 20 U .S. C. § l 4 12(a)(4).
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Act or applicable regulations prevents a State from going
beyond what the IDEA requires and imposing a burden of proof
on school systems in administrative hearings." 65 Likewise,
individual states filing as amiCI curiae in support of
Petitioners 66 urged the Supreme Court to explicitly recognize
that states have the authority, consistent with the
constitutional value of federalism, to direct that their local
school districts bear the burden of proof in an IDEA
administrative hearing. 67
The rationale offered by Respondents and amici for
permitting states to adopt a different rule when dealing with
the administration of a federal program ties back largely to the
nature of Spending Clause legislation. Such statutes, like the
IDEA, condition funding on compliance with minimum federal
standards, but allow states to expand on those requirements
and "grant additional benefits to their residents." 68 The IDEA
restricts states in their educational policy and resource
allocation decisions only to the extent that the Secretary of
Education does not approve the state plan for eligibility, and/or
the state standards conflict with the federal Act's procedures. 69
Notably, the U.S. Department of Education has not reviewed
the allocation of the burden of proof in determining states'
65. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Res pondent at *1718, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698) , 2005 WL 1527082; Brief for Respondents
at *48-49, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 WL I505062; Oral Argument
at *36, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 WL 2651391 ("If States wanted
to voluntarily assume th e burden of proof for their own school districts in [due process)
proceedings ... we think that States could do so, and that that would be the rule that
applies. We don't quarrel with that); Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Hawaii ,
Alaska, a nd Oklahoma and the Territory of Guam in Support of Respondents at *8-11,
Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698) , 2005 WL 1527081; Brief of Virgini a School
Boards Association and Five Other School Board Associations as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at *13 and *17, Schaffer, 546 U .S. 49 (2005) (04-698), 2005 WL
1521614.
66. Virginia, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, Rhode Island,
Washington, a nd Wisconsin fiJed in support of Petitioners an d in favor of placing the
burden of proof on the school district. Brief of the Commonwealth of Virgini a a nd Eight
Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at *1, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49
(2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 WL 1031635.
67. Id. at *14-17.
68. Brief for Responden ts at *49, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005
WL 1505062; Oral Argument at *36-37, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005
WL 2651391. States also have plenary power to create school districts and define their
powers. See Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Eight Other States as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at *15, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698),
2005 WL 1031635.
69. S ee, e.g., Battle v. Pa., 629 F.2d 269, 279-80 (3d Cir. 1980).
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eligibility for funds under the IDEA. 70
Ironically, Petitioners' argument in Schaffer that the
burden of proof is a federal-law question-not open to the
states to decide 71 -undercuts Petitioners' preferred burden
allocation, in light of the Supreme Court's current default rule.
In matters primarily of state concern, however, the Supreme
Court has long recognized that while "[t]he scope of a federal
right is, of course, a federal question ... that does not mean
that its content is not to be determined by state, rather than
federal law." 72 "The fact that Congress specified a number of
details governing the IEP process does not indicate an
intention to allocate the burden of proof one way or the
other,"73 or to abrogate states' express directive to establish
and maintain procedures for special education due process
hearings. 74 Justice Breyer's dissent in Schaffer noted that the
IDEA's minimum federal standards are "unrelated to the
'burden of persuasion' question," and that "[n]othing in the Act
suggests a need to fill every interstice of the Act's remedial
scheme with a uniform federal rule." 75
The objection that an inconsistent pattern of burden
assignment among the states runs counter to the IDEA's equal
protection purpose 76 also does not withstand scrutiny.
Comparing the trend in school finance litigation (shifting to
more expansive state constitutional rights) to the "burgeoning"
trend in the area of special education (shifting to more
expansive state statutory rights), the Fourth Circuit, for
example, has quoted with approval state court decisions
reconciling state law differentiation with the Equal Protection
Clause:
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards
imposed upon us by the United States Supreme Court's

70. Brief for the United Sta tes as Amicus Curiae Suppor ting Respondent a t *17,
Schaffe r, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 WL 152708 2.
71. See Oral Argum ent at *6- 7, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005
WL 2651 391 ; Re ply Brief of Petitioners at * 11, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04698), 2005 WL 1812490.
72. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U .S. 570, 580 (1956).
73 . Reply Brief of P etition ers at *12, S chaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698),
2005 WL 18 12490.
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) .
75. Scha ffer, 546 U.S at 70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76. S ee Kevin Pendergast , Schaffer's Reminder: IDEA N eeds Another
Improvem ent, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 875, 884 (2006).
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interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are free,
and we are under a duty, to develop additional constitutional
rights and privileges under our . . . [c]onstitution if we find
such fundamental rights and privileges to be within the
intention and spirit of our local constitutional language .. .
We need not stand by idly and passively, waiting for
constitutional direction from the highest court of the land.
Instead[,] we should be moving concurrently to develop and
expound the principles embedded in our constitutionallaw. 77

The states who filed as amici curiae in support of
Petitioners in Schaffer similarly recognized that "the
relationship between the IDEA and substantive state law is
like the relationship between the United States Constitution
and the State Constitutions." 78 Thus, where Congress has
chosen not to explicitly allocate the burden of proof in IDEA
due process hearings, and when the Supreme Court has
established a minimum default rule placing the burden of proof
on the moving party in the absence of state legislation, states
are then free to adopt more stringent procedures by statute or
regulation 79 without runmng afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

IV. FEDERAL COURTS' PREEMPTION ANALYSES POST-SCHAFFER
Federal courts have made clear that a state statute or
regulation must contain explicit burden-of-proof language to
avoid preemption under the IDEA, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Schaffer. 80 Moreover, federal courts have
77. Conklin v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 306, 32B (4th Cir.
1991) (quoting Baker v. Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 40 1~02 (Alas ka 1970)).
78. S ee Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Eight Other States as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at *16 n.l :3, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04698), 2005 WL 10:31635; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 274-75 (2 000)
(recognizing t he Supreme Court's established practice, rooted in federali s m, to a llow
states wide di scretion. subject to the minimum requireme nts of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to experiment with solutions to difficult problems of policy).
79. S ee infra discussion of L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ. a t note 81.
80. See Kerry M. v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. # 114, No. 03 C 9349, 2006 WL
2862 118, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2006) (holding Illinois' statutes do not expressly place
a burden of proof on the school district suffici ent to override the default rule in
S chaffer). Illinois' statute provides only t hat a school district shall "present evidence
that the special education n eeds of the child have been appropriately identifi ed and
that the special education program and r elated se rvices proposed to meet the needs of
the child are adequate, appropriate, and availa ble." 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-8.02a(g55) (emph asis added). The Di strict Court in Kerry M. (citing section 8.02(h), superseded
by section 8.02a for all impartial due process h earings requ ested on or after July 1,
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understood that state statutes or regulations-not state
courts-must provide the rule of law in a state that wishes to
override the Supreme Court's default rule allocating the
burden of proof to the moving party. 81 State legislatures are
the arm of the state best equipped to determine the applicable
burden of proof, as the legislative process can attract
widespread input from state and local constituents, and
constituents can hold elected officials accountable for the policy
decisions they make.
Nonetheless, in a decision filed in January of 2008, the
Eighth Circuit read Schaffer to support the IDEA's preemption
of Minnesota Statutes Section 125A.091, Subdivision 16, which
allocates the burden of proof to the school district in a special
education due process hearing.82 In reversing the decision of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, the
Eighth Circuit in M.M. v. Special Sch. Dist. No . 1 pointed to its
previous decision in Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11 v.
Renollett, 440 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2006) as controlling law.83
The Eighth Circuit in R enollett had, in a footnote, adjudged
that allocating the burden of proof to the school district was
harmless error, in light of Schaffer, given that the school
district ultimately prevailed on the student's challenge to the
district's provision of a free appropriate public education. 84

1997) read this language to refer to the burden of production, as distinguished from the
burden of persuasion. Kerry M ., 2006 WL 2862118, at *5.
8 1. See L.E. , 435 F.3d at 391 (rejecting a ppellants' contention that Schaffer does
not affect the burden of proof assigned by New Jersey's highest state court, where New
Jersey lacks a "statutory or regulatory provision purporting to define the burden of
proof in administrative hearings assessing IEPs"); see also Fisher v. Stafford Twp. Bd.
of Educ., No. 05-2020, 2007 WL 674304, at *11 n.10 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2007) (finding
that, "in the a bsence of a New Jersey statute or regulation placing the burden [of proof]
on the school district, there is simply no reason to depart from" the Supreme Court's
default rule in Schaffer).
82. M.M., 512 F. 3d at 458-59. MINN. STAT. § 125A.091 (2007), Subdivision 16
provides, in pertinent part: "[t]he burden of proof at a due process hearing is on the
district to demonstrate, by a preponderance of t he evidence, that it is complying with
the law and offered or provided a free appropriate public education to the child in the
least restrictive environment."
83. M.M., 512 F.3d at 459. The Eighth Circuit also held t hat the burden of proof
was improperly placed on the school district at an administrative hearing in West
Platte R-II Sch. Dist. v. Wilson, 439 F.3d 782, 784--85 (8th Cir. 2006). However, that
case did not present a preemption issue since Missouri law applied, and Missouri did
not have any statute or regulation allocating the burden of proof in due process
hearings under the IDEA. M.M. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-2270, 2006 WL
2571229, at *14 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2006).
84. 440 F.3d at 1010 n.3.
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The District Court in M.M. had declined to follow Renollett
on grounds that the Eighth Circuit neither referenced the
Minnesota statutory allocation of the burden of proof, nor
addressed the Supreme Court's express decision to set aside
the question of states' authority to statutorily assign the
burden of proof. 85 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit in M.M.
explained that its "opinion in Renollett cited the page in
Schaffer that left the question open, and ... then decided the
question for ... courts [in the Eighth Circuit] ." 86 The Eighth
Circuit did not, however, offer any explanation as to why it
interpreted Schaffer to preempt Minnesota's statute, given that
the Supreme Court's holding was defined in the absence of
state legislation allocating the relevant burden of proof.
The District Court's holding in M.M., though overruled,
should not be overlooked here. The Court cited case law
emphasizing the IDEA's cooperative federalism design in
support of the notion that, "for the purposes of the IDEA,
where a state law is more stringent than a federal law, the two
are consistent and the state law is not subject to federal
preemption." 87 Significantly, the District Court observed that
the Supreme Court's holding in Schaffer was not based on any
finding that allocation of the burden of proof to a school district
interferes with the IDEA's substantive guarantees. 88 Rather,
the Supreme Court held that "[a]bsent some reason to believe
that Congress intended otherwise ... we will conclude that the
burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, on the party
seeking relie£." 89 In keeping with this logic, the District Court
upheld states' authority to establish "more stringent
procedures for effectuating the substantive guarantees of the
85. M.M., 2006 WL 2571229 at *14-15. In a decision that post-dated Schaffer but
pre-dated West Platte and Reno/lett, the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota found that the ALJ correctly placed the burden of proof at the
administrative level on the school district in accordance with Minnesota law. See
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 701 v. J.T., No. Civ. 05-1892 DWFRLE, 2006 WL 517648, at *6
n.6 (D. Minn. Feb. 28, 2006).
86. M.M. , 512 F.3d at 459. The Eighth Circuit reversed on the merits both "the
ALJ's award of compensatory educational services and the District Court's award of
attorneys' fees under the IDEA." Id.; see also P.K.W.G. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No . 11, No.
07-402 3, 2008 WL 2405818, *9 (D . Minn. June 11, 2008) (citing M.M. and Renollett in
holding that federal law preempts Minn. Stat. § 125A.091, subd. 16 to the extent it
places the burden of proof in an IDEA due process hearing always on the school
district) .
87. M .M., 2006 WL 2571229 at *16 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
88. !d.
89. Id. (quoting Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57-58).
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IDEA," in the absence of evidence that Congress intended to
impose the "default rule" on states which assign the burden
differently .9°
By way of a footnote in two separate cases post-dating
Schaffer, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
similarly upheld the validity of the then-current D.C.
regulation 91 placing the burden of proof at the administrative
level on the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS). 92 The
District Court recognized the limited nature of the Supreme
Court's Schaffer holding, defined in the absence of state
legislation specifically allocating the burden of proof in an
IDEA due process hearing.9 3
Likewise, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia acknowledged the preemption issue left unresolved
by the Supreme Court in Schaffer and applied Georgia's thencurrent Board of Education Rules 94 to determine the applicable

90. M.M., 2006 WL 2571229 at *16. Other post-Schaffer federal court decisions
have upheld the application of a state statute placing the burden of proof on th e school
district, without needing to reach the preemption issue. In Escambia, for example, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama found that Alabama's
regulations at the time of the administrative decision specifically imposed the burden
of proof on school districts in IEP due process hearings. Escambia County Bd. of Educ.
v. Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1264-65 (S.D. Ala. 2005). The school board did not
raise any argument that Schaffer 's default rule took precedence over Alabama's
regulations; rather, the school board unsuccessfully argued that the Court should apply
an amendment to Alabama's Department of Education regulations tha t went into effect
more t han a year and a half after the hearing officer issued the administrative
decision. ld. at 1263-65.
91. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5, § 3030.3 (2003) provided: "The [school district] shall
bear the burden of proof, based solely upon the evidence and testimony presented at
the hearing, that the action or proposed placement is adequate to meet the educational
needs of the student." Section 3030.3 was later amended, effective June 30, 2006, to
place the burden of proof upon the party seeking relief.
92. See Gellert v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 435 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 n.3 (D.D.C. 2006);
Schoenbach v. D.C., No. 05-1591 (RMC), 2006 WL 1663426, at *4 n.3 (D.D.C. June 12,
2006) . Note that two earlier cases in this District cited to Schaffer for the burden of
proof without any mention of D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5, § 3030.3. See Hester v. D.C. , 433
F. Supp. 2d 71, 76 (D.D.C. 2006), rev'd on other grounds, Hester v. D.C., 505 F.3d 1283
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Savoy-Kelly v. E. High School, No. Civ.A. 04-1751(GK), 2006 WL
1000346, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2006). Two other cases in this District assumed,
without having to decide, the validity of the D.C. regulation placing the burden of proof
on the school district. See Roark ex rel. Roark v. D.C., 460 F. Supp. 2d 32, 39 n .6
(D.D.C. 2006); Jenkins v. D.C., No. Civ.A. 02-01055 HHK, 2005 WL 3371048, at *2 n.4
(D.D.C . Dec. 12, 2005) .
93. Gellert, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 22 n.3.
94. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160·4-7-.18(1)(g)(8)(2000) provided, in pertinent part:
"Generally, the [school district] shall bear the burden of coming forward with the
evidence and burden of proof at any administrative hearing to establish that the
proposed IEP is appropriate and provides FAPE. If the parents propose a placement
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burden of proof. 95 In holding that the ALJ properly placed the
burden of proof on the parent at the administrative hearing,
the District Court reasoned that the case fell within the latter
category set forth under the state rule: the parent sought a
more restrictive placement than the one provided by the
existing, agreed upon IEP.9 6
Even more recently, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Connecticut held, in two unrelated decisions, that the burden
of proof should be placed upon the school district during an
IDEA administrative hearing, in accordance with Connecticut
Department of Education regulations providing that the public
agency has the burden of proving the appropriateness of a
child's existing or proposed educational program or
placement. 97
Thus, the Eighth Circuit's answer to the preemption
question left open in Schaffer stands alone among the answers
of federal courts 98 that have decided the question in the
presence of a state statute or regulation expressly assigning
the burden of proof to the school district in a special education
due process hearing. On October 20, 2008, the U.S. Supreme
Court denied a petition for review of the Eighth Circuit's
decision in M.M.Y 9 In denying the petition, the Supreme Court
that is more restrictive than provided by an existing agreed upon lEP, the parents
shall bear the burden of establishing that the more t'estrictive environment is
appropriate." GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-4-7-.18(1)(g)(8) was amended effective May 1,
2006, and subsequently amended in the form of section 160-4-7-.12(il)(l) effective .July
1, 2007, to eliminate the hybrid structure and place the burden of persuasion and
burden of production upon the party seeking relief at the administrative bearing.
95. W.C. ex. rel. Sue C. v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1:151, 1:359
(N.D. Ga. 2005).
96. Id.
97. P. ex. rel. Mr. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 512 F. Supp. 2d 89, 99 (D. Conn.
2007); see also Brennan v. Reg'] Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 531 F. Supp. 2d 245, 267
(D. Conn. Jan. 4, 2008) (agreeing with Justice Breyer's dissent in Schaffer, "which
concluded that the IDEA's model of cooperative federalism did not intend to preempt
states' abilities to determine the burden of proof for themselves." 546 U.S. at 69-70
(Breyer J. dissenting)). But see M.K. v. Sergi, 554 F. Supp. 2d 201, 221 (D. Conn.
2008). The court in M.K. confused the burden of persuasion with the burden of
production when describing Judge Hall's holding from Brennan. Judge Hall recognized
that the moving party retains the burden of production not the burden of persuasion
- under Connecticut law. Brennan, 5:31 F. Supp. 2d at 267. Accordingly, while the
court in M.K. purported to agree with ,Judge Hall, the court actually n'achm! the
opposite finding that plaintiffs, as the parties challenging the adequacy of the l EPs,
bore the initial burden of persuasion. M.K., 554 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
98. Notwithstanding the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut's
decision in M.K. u. Sergi, discussed supra at note 97.
99. M.M., 2008 WL 2442939 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2008).
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passed up an opportunity to both decide states' authority to
override the default rule based on the case at hand, and
uniformly align federal courts' treatment of state burden of
proof statutes and regulations with the IDEA's cooperative
federalism design. The issue of states' authority will likely resurface before the Supreme Court, however, given the potential
for a split among federal circuit courts faced with applying
Schaffer in states that have assigned the burden of proof to
school districts by statute or regulation.
V. THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPE OF STATE LEGISLATION ON THE
BURDEN OF PROOF

The Supreme Court's default rule in Schaffer resolved the
Circuit Court split on the IDEA burden allocation in line with
states that had assigned the burden of proof to the moving
party, either by statute 100 or court precedent. 101 Thus, Schaffer
did not change the customary burden in those states. Schaffer's
impact, however, has not been limited to states without IDEAspecific burden-of-proof legislation in jurisdictions that had
customarily assigned the burden of proof to the school district.
Rather, in the wake of Schaffer, states with and without
statutes or regulations allocating the burden of proof have
moved to amend or newly legislate the burden assignment to
either align with or depart from the Supreme Court's default
rule.I02

100. See 707 KY. ADMIN. REGS.1:340, Section 11(4) (2004), incorporating by
r eference KY. REV. STA'I'. ANN. § 13B.090(7) (West 2007) ("In all administrative
hearings . . . the party proposing th e agency take action or grant a benefit h as the
burden to show the propriety of the agency action or entitlement to the benefit
sought"); 511 IND. ADMI N. CODE, 7-30-3 (2003), incorporating by reference IND. CODE§
4- 21.5-8-14 (2002) (" ... the agency or other person reques ting that a n agency take
action ... ha s the burden of persuasio n and the burden of going forw ard with the proof
of t he request ... ").
101. Prior to the Supreme Court's Schaffer decision, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Tenth and El eventh Circuits had assigned the burden of proof to the moving party.
States under the jurisdiction of these Circuits that did not have state statutes or
regulations expressly assigning the burden of proof included: Colorado, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virgini a, and Wyoming.
102. Of th e seven states that had ex pressly assigned the burden of proof to school
districts by statute or r eg ulation at the time of Schaffer, four states have maintained
that burden allocation to date: Connecticut, Delaware, Minnesota, and West Virginia.
(The burden of proof provision in West Virginia now appears under Policy 2419:
Regul a tion s for the Education of Students with Exceptio nalities, incorporated by
reference under W.VA. Com: R. § 126-16-3 (2008)) . Alaska, Washington D.C. , and
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The problem lies m state officials' and interested
constituents' efforts to bolster or restrict states' movements
based on compliance with the Supreme Court's Schaffer
decision. An emphasis on compliance diverts attention from
states' authority to independently assign the burden of proof,
and threatens both the integrity and passage of state
legislation.
Following Schaffer, the Education Commissioner in Alaska
sought to change Alaska's burden of proof regulation, which
placed the burden of proof at all due process hearings on the
school district, even if the parent requested the hearing. 103 The
Commissioner recognized that the Supreme Court specifically
mentioned Alaska's burden of proof regulation in Schaffer, and
was "leaving for another day" the question of whether state
laws placing the burden of proof on the school district would be
permitted under federallaw. 104 Nonetheless, the Commissioner
submitted a proposed amendment to Alaska's regulation that
would shift the IDEA burden of proof from the school district to
the party that requests a hearing, in an effort "to conform to
the November 14th U.S. Supreme Court ruling." 105 At a Board
of Education meeting where the proposed amendment was
later adopted, Alaska's Assistant Attorney General clarified
that the amendment would align the state's due process
procedures with federal law, but that the change was a matter

Georgia represent those states that, following Schaffer, shifted their regulatory burden
of proof in IDEA due process hearings to the moving party. Of those states that did not
have any state statute or regulation allocating the burden of proof in special education
due process hearings at the time of Schaffer, New York, New Jersey, Hawaii, Virginia,
California, and Pennsylvania have since moved to legislatively assign the burden of
proof to the school district. As of the date this article was submitted for publication,
the legislative measures failed in Hawaii, Virginia, and California, and were pending
in Pennsylvania. According to New Jersey's Public Advocate, parent movements are
building to pass legislation shifting the burden of proof to school districts in Arizona,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. See SPECIAL EDUCATION
DUE PROCESS, supra note 26, at 17 n .31 (Jan. 2007). Maryland, the jurisdiction of the
administrative hearing in Schaffer, amended § 8-413 of its Annotated Code, effective
July 1, 2006, to mirror the IDEA's provisions regarding hearing officer decisions under
20 U .S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i)-(ii), without expressly assigning the burden of proof. See
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 8-413(g)(1)-(2) (West 2008).
103. Memorandum from Roger Sampson, Comm'r to Members of the Ala. State Bd.
of Educ. & Early Dev. (Nov. 30, 2005) (discussing attached proposed amendments to
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550(e)(9), now codified in pertinent part at
§ 52.550(i)(ll) (2008)) .
104. !d.
105. !d.
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of policy, not law. 106
The D.C. Board of Education also drafted a resolution to
align D.C.'s burden-of-proof regulation with the Schaffer
decision. The resolution presented and later adopted by
members of the D.C. Board of Education similarly referenced
the Supreme Court's holding in Schaffer, and stated, in
pertinent part: "Title 5, DCMR, Section 3030.3[, requiring the
school district to prove the adequacy of its special education
plans when challenged by parents,] is inconsistent with the
current ruling and should be amended to bring [the District of
Columbia Public Schools (DCPS)] into compliance with the
Congressional intent of IDEA as interpreted by the US
Supreme Court." 107 Interestingly, the Council of Great City
Schools, a coalition of large urban public school systems in the
United States, submitted a report to DCPS following the
Schaffer decision that targeted D.C.'s burden-of-proof
regulation as a "root" of the problem facing D.C.'s budgeting for
special education. 108 Having concluded that D.C.'s special
education costs were "warping the school system's overall
expenditures," the Council recommended a reversal of D.C.'s
burden-of-proof regulation, among other measures, to help
reduce costs. 109
Two years earlier, however, the D.C. Appleseed Center had
released a joint report with DLA Piper LLP, finding that an
estimated one-third of all due process hearings arose from
DCPS's failure to comply with previous hearing officer
decisions or to implement settlement agreements. 110 Additional
hearing requests were filed because DCPS failed to timely
evaluate children, develop IEPs, and/or respond to parents'
questions and concerns. 111 Notably, the Appleseed report's

106. Minutes of State Bd. of Educ. and Early Dev. Meeting at 6 (Mar. 16, 2006).
107. D.C. Bd. ofEduc. Res. SR06·20 at 1 (D.C. 2006).
108. COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., FINANCING EXCELLENCE IN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS: REVIEW OF FINANCE AND BUDGET OPERATIONS OF THE
D.C. PUBLIC SCHOOLS 57 (2005). The report was requested by then D.C . School's
Superintendent Dr. Clifford B. Janey shortly after he took office in September 2004. Id.
at 53. The Council conducted its site visit to the D.C. Public Schools from February 27
through March 2, 2005. Id. at 13.
109. !d. at 73.
110. D.C. APPLESEED CTR. & PIPER RUDNICK LLP, A TIME FOR ACTION: THE NEED
TO REPAIR THE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING SPECIAL EDUCATION DISPUTES IN THE DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
18,
28
(2003) ,
http://www.dcappleseed.org/projects/publications/Special_Ed_Rprt.pdf.
111. ld. at 6, 28. See also Letter from The Council of Parent Attorneys and
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recommendations to DCPS made no mention of shifting the
burden of proof away from school districts. 112
In New York, some time passed before the burden of proof
was shifted to the school district by statute. The burden-ofproof legislation signed by former New York State Governor
Eliot Spitzer on August 15, 2007 113 revived the bills vetoed by
former Governor George Pataki on July 26, 2006. 114 As initially
introduced and passed by both houses of the New York State
Legislature in 2006, the bills would have placed the burden of
proof in impartial due process hearings on the school district or
responsible state agency and restored the pre-Schaffer status
quo in New York. 115 In exercising his veto, Governor Pataki
recognized that the Supreme Court declined to reach the
question of whether states could shift the burden of proof to
school districts. 116 Nonetheless, his veto message set forth the
position of opponents to the bill, 117 who argued "that federal
law does not authorize shifting the burden of proof in IDEA
Advocates, Inc. (COPAA) to Russell Smith, Executive Dir., D.C. Bd. of Educ. 2 (Apr. 20 ,
2006) (regarding proposed change to District of Columbia burden of proof municipa l
regulation, D.C. MUN. REG S. tit. 5, § 3030.3 (2003)).
11 2. Rather. the report recommended that DCPS and the District government
focus on (i) providing the necessary resources to a ddres s existing deficiencies in
assessment and placement ser vices in D.C. neighborhood schools, (ii) establishing clear
lines of a uthority for s pecia l e ducation program respons ibilities and holding DCPS
personne l accountable for matters assigned to them, (iii) providing and publicizing
procedures for r esolving dispu tes at an early stage (such as mediation a nd facilitation
services through a n independent dispute resolution organization), and (iv) improvi n g
the administration of due process hearings through a dequa te staffing, training, a nd
organi zational restructuring. D.C. APPLESEE D CTR. & PlPElt RUDN ICK LLP, supra note
110, at 11-13. Th e report noted that any short-term increases in spending resulting
from the proposed recommendations would be outweighed by s ubstanti al long-term
cost savings resulting from redirecting funds to th e "actual delive ry of s pecial ed ucation
services and in avoiding the escalati ng costs th at occ ur when children's needs are
neglected." Id. at 13.
11 3. See Associ a t ed Press, Law puts burden of proof on schools in special education
disputes, NEWSDAY, Aug. 16, 2007. The a me ndment to§ 4404 of New Yor k's Education
Law, effective October 14, 2007, provides that the school di strict bear the burden of
persuasion and burden of prod uction in any impartia l hearing, except where paren ts
seek tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placemen t in a p rivate school. N.Y. Euuc.
LAw§ 4404 (McKinney 2007).
114. See Governor George E. Pataki Veto Message No. 286.
115. See Schaffer u. Weast Passed Both Houses of Legislature, NYSARC, In c.,
(updated July 5, 2006), http://www.nysarc.org/news-info/nysarc-news-view-storydetail.asp?var ID= 103.
116. See Governor George E. Pataki Veto Message No. 286.
117. Governor Pataki noted that the New York State Education Department , th e
New York City Department of Education , the New York State School Board s
Association, and th e Conference of Big 5 School Districts all opposed passage of Senate
Bill No. 8354. Id.
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cases." 118 Governor Pataki premised his disapproval of the bill
on the fact that final regulations implementing IDEA 2004
were not yet promulgated, and that these regulations could
establish a uniform national rule that would preempt any
inconsistent state law. 119 The final implementing regulations
ultimately did no such thing. 120
On January 14, 2008, New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine
signed into law state legislation which, effective immediately,
placed both the burden of persuasion and burden of production
on school districts in special education due process hearings. 121
In opposition to the proposed legislation, the New Jersey
School Boards Association had frequently characterized the bill
as an attempt to "circumvent" a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court
ruling. 122
A similar objection was voiced at a local school board
meeting in Virginia, where the Director of Community
Relations and Legislative Services for the school district
commented that the Virginia Senate bill-intended to assign
school districts the burden of persuasiOn m IDEA
administrative hearings-is "inconsistent with current legal
principle and/or court decisions." 123 The Virginia Senate
ultimately left the bill in the Committee on Education and
Health. 124

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Sec 71 Fed. Reg. 46540, 46706 (Aug. 14, 2006).
121. The Star-Ledger Continuou s News Desk, Legislation Signed, Vetoed by
Corzine, N.J.com, J an . 15, 2008. See N.J . Senate Bill No. 2604, supplementing N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 18A:46 (West 2008). The Supreme Court of New Jersey has since upheld
the Legi slature's allocation of the burden of proof to the local school distri ct in du e
process hearings concerning the "identification, evaluation, r eevaluation , classification,
edu cational placement, [] provision of a free, a ppropri ate public education, or
disciplin ary acti on, of a child with a disability." Bd. of Educ. of Ci ty of Sea Isle City v.
Kennedy, 196 N .•J. 1, 20- 2 1 (2008).
122 . New J ersey School Boards Association, New J er sey's Weekly Education News
Report, Volume XXX Number 28 at 2 (Ma r. 8, 2007); see also New Jersey School Boards
Association. New ,Jersey's Weekly Education News Report , Volume XXX Numb er 38 a t
1 (May 17, 2007); New Jersey School Boar ds Associa tion, New J ersey's Weekly
Education News Report. Volume XXX Number 39 at 1 (May 24, 2007) .
128. See Draft Minutes of th e School Board of the Ci ty of Newport News, Regular
Session (Oct. 17, 2006) .
124. See S.B. 241 Bill Tracking (2007 session), http://leg l. st a te.va.us/cgibin/le gp504 .exe'?071 +sum+SB241.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in Schaffer-premised on
federal statutory silence and defined in the absence of state
legislation-has left room for a variant of Justice Breyer's
dissent to emerge in practice. States retain the ability to
determine their own burden-of-proof rules in special education
due process hearings, not through an ALJ's application of
general administrative rules, but through a legislative or
regulatory process that solicits widespread, IDEA-specific
input.
For states to fully realize their roles as "vital cells" of
democratic action however, experimentation and accountability
must replace efforts to conform. State action or inaction on the
burden allocation should reflect actual state policy choicesrather than compliance with the federal default rule-and
state legislatures and officials should be held responsible for
those choices. At the same time, courts interpreting Schaffer
should recognize that the IDEA's model of cooperative
federalism did not intend to preempt states' abilities to
independently assign the burden of proof by statute or
regulation. The interests of children, parents, educators, school
administrators, disability rights advocates, taxpayers, and
state and federal governments are all at stake.

